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WHEN BUSINESS DECISIONS OF A CLIENT
CREATE A CURRENT CLIENT CONFLICT
OF INTEREST: IMPLICATIONS IN A
COMPLEX ETHICAL LANDSCAPE
Abstract: Lawyers have an ethical duty to be loyal to their clients.
Conflict of interest questions involving loyalty are increasingly at issue in
the modern climate of mergers and acquisitions. When there is a
traditional client conflict the courts favor disqualification, finding the
risk to loyalty values too extreme. Yet, when there is a corporate affiliate
situation, or when the conflict is created by client business decisions and
not the law firm, the balance may and should be shifted. This Note
argues that courts should follow the flexible, practical, balancing of
facts and circumstances approach instead of a strict per se rule. This
balancing of facts and circumstances must consider all facts that
implicate loyalty, including the law firm's fault in creating the conflict.
This Note concludes that a more flexible balancing approach, which
includes whether the law firm is at fault in creating the conflict,
adequately protects loyalty values while preventing the misuse of
disqualification motions as a litigation tactic.
INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Gould, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Pechiney and
Tremfimetaux ("Pechiney"). 1
 In the lawsuit, Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Min-
ing Co' Smelting Co., Gould was represented by the law firm of Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue ("Jones, Day"). 2 Jones, Day also represented IG
Technologies, Inc. in various contractual matters.3
 Unfortunately, in
1989, Pechiney acquired IG Technologies, putting Jones, Day in the
position of suing the subsidiary of a current client. 4
Lawyers have an ethical duty to be loyal to their clients. 5 One
component of the duty of loyalty is that a lawyer cannot be directly
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
5 /d. at 1122.
3 /d. at 1123.
4 Id.
5 Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Rtplesenting Members of Corporate Families,
72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 662 (1997) (explaining that attorneys are clients' agents and
owe fiduciary duties including loyalty).
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adverse or materially adverse to the interest of a current client, such
as the position in which Jones, Day found itself. 6 This duty of loyalty is
the basis for the attorney-client relationship, a relationship in which
clients reveal their most intimate confidences.? A law firm's undivided
and uncompromising loyalty to its clients is fundamental to the integ-
rity of legal representation.8 Just as important, it is vital to the lay-
man's perception of justice. 9 Four general policies, therefore, drive
the duty of loyalty and the conflict of interest rules that accompany
this duty: (1) maintaining professional judgment and thereby effec-
tive representation; (2) maintaining confidentiality; (3) protecting
the client's expectations; and (4) "furthering broader societal objec-
tives."10
Conflict of interest and loyalty issues can occur in a variety of
situations. A traditional current client conflict can arise if a law firm
that represents two clients, A and B, sues Client B on behalf of Client
A." Even if the suit on behalf of A against B is unrelated to the law
firm's representation of B, the basic ethical rule is that adversity is
prohibited as a breach of loyalty to a current client. 12 Traditionally,
jurisdictions have used either a per se rule of disqualification or a
prima facie rule to prohibit such representation. 19 Yet, as the legal
6 See Nora Pasman, The Conflict of "Conflict of Interest*: The Michigan Example, 1995 Drr.
C. L. REV. 133, 133 (1995); see also Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1123.
7 E.g., Pasman, supra note 6, at 133 (describing loyalty as the basis of the attorney-client
relationship).
8 See Lara E. Romansic, Conflict of Interest: Stand by Your Client?: Opinion 93-390 and
Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Families, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 307, 315 (1998).
9 See ABA Comm. on Prorl Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 390) (Fox, dissenting) (arguing "[t] he last thing our profession
needs is another black eye caused by jettisoned client loyalty in the name of economic
expediency"); Pasman, supra note 6, at 159, (quoting G.A.C. Commercial Corp. v. Maho-
ney Typographers, Inc., 238 N.W.2d 575, 577-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)) (noting that if
attorney's conduct appears unethical, regardless of actual ethical violation, that respect
and trust in profession is weakened such that ethical questions should be resolved on side
of caution).
IC Michael Sacksteder, Formal Opinion 95-390 of the ABA's Ethics Committee: Corporate Cli-
ents, Conflicts of Interest, and Keeping the Lid on Pandora's Box, 91 Nw. U. L REV. 741, 748-49
(1997).
" See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 661-62.
12 Id. (noting that representation is generally prohibited even if unrelated); see also
Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, 1 J. brs-r. S-ruo. LEGAL Emits 87, 97 (1996)
(quoting Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 184 (Conn. 1964)) (arguing if a client
is sued and loses something valuable, like his home, all feeling of loyalty is destroyed re-
gardless of whether the representations are related).
13 See Morgan, supra note 12, at 88; Rotunda, supra note 5, at 687-88.
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environment has shifted in the last twenty years, these strict rules are
increasingly challenged as out of date and unduly formalistic.m
Conflict of interest questions are increasingly at issue in the
modern climate of mergers and acquisitions, as in the case of Gould."
In this situation, courts must decide what rules apply when a law firm
suddenly finds itself adverse to a client's affiliate because of a business
action of a client, such as a merger or an acquisition." There is a
breach of loyalty when a law firm is adverse to a current client, even
when there is no relationship between the two representations, but, of
course, there is no loyalty issue when a law firm is adverse to a non-
client." Therefore, the key question when a law firm is adverse to a
corporate affiliate of a client, known as a corporate family conflict, is
whether the affiliate should be treated as a client or non-client for
conflict of interest purposes." Various courts and commentators have
advocated approaches ranging from per se treatment of an affiliate of
a client as an actual client to considering corporate family members as
completely separate entities."
State and federal ethical codes ultimately define and regulate the
attorney's duty of loyalty and attempt to address these questions.%)
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and its replacement, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
both address conflicts of interest by emphasizing loyalty to the cli-
14 See, e.g., Andrew Drucker, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solutions to Conflict Ducking
and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Expansion of the Larger Law Firm, 24 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 529,530-31 (1999) (noting law firm growth increases number of conflict situations and
Model Rules are increasingly incapable of dealing with new and unique conflicts in the
modern legal world); Morgan, supra note 12, at 88 (noting that law firms have specialized,
and grown and clients hire many different firms such that ignoring new structure of law
firms may place too many restrictions on the activities of both clients and lawyers). But see
Pasman, supra note 6, at 166 (criticizing courts for increasingly allowing representations
that they previously would have prevented and weakening enforcement of conflict rules
despite voicing strict messages condemning such representation).
19 See Romansic, supra note 7, at 307 (noting that corporate families often change
through mergers and acquisitions and that as this happens the potential for current
conflicts increases).
16 See, e.g., Colorpix Sys. of Am. v. Broan Mfg. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 331 (D. Conn.
2001).
1' Rotunda, supra note 5, at 662-63.
16 See id. at 676.
19
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
§ 121 Reporter's Note cmt. d (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
" See, e.g., Pasman, supra note 6, at 134.
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ent. 2
 Additionally, there has been substantial development of the
duty of loyalty in both case law and ethics opinions. 22
This Note addresses the duty of loyalty, and the prohibition
against suing or otherwise acting adversely to your own client, in the
context of mergers and acquisitions." Furthermore, it examines what
rules should govern given the complex interaction of three para-
digms: current conflicts between traditional clients, conflict with a
former client, and the hot potato rule, which prohibits a law firm
from dropping one client to undertake representation of another cli-
ent.24 Part I of this Note addresses the current state of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"), Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
("Restatement"), and ethical opinions in resolving current client and
corporate affiliate conflicts.25 Part II discusses the general case history
and the differences between the per se rule and the facts and circum-
stances test." Part III addresses how a conflict caused by the actions of
the client should be addressed in the context of the per se rule and
the facts and circumstances test. 27 Part IV argues for a practical ap-
proach that looks for real, instead of imaginary, conflicts."
I. THE BASIC ETHICAL DOCTRINE
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Rules") and Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity ("Model Code") embody the basic doctrine on conflicts of interest."
Although the Model Rules and the Model Code have formed the basis for
state ethics rules, both of these documents were meant to have force
21 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1999); MoDEL CODE OF PROF'L RE
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1983); Sacksteder, supra note 9, at '745-48.
22 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 665-66 (noting that discrepancies between district
courts is now "standard operating procedure" because of a 1981 Supreme Court case,
Firestone Tire Ce Rubber Co. u &lord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), that rejected appeals to denials of
disqualification motions and the ensuing development of this holding by federal and state
courts).
23 See infra notes 29-326 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 29-326 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 29-84 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 86-161 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 162-278 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 279-326 and accompanying text.
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1999); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILrYY DR 5-105 (1983).
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only within the membership of the ABA." An increasing number of
states have adopted the Model Rules with various modifications, al-
though a significant minority have adopted modified Model Codes."
The state rules of professional conduct are followed by the state
courts.32 Meanwhile, the federal courts try to apply a national stan-
dard of ethics by relying on the state ethics codes, as well as the Model
Code and the Model Rules. 33
A. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Model Code is made up of Canons, Ethical Considerations
("EC") and Disciplinary Rules ("DR" ). 34
 Canons are general direc-
tives, while Ethical Considerations are more specific guidelines that
are not binding." In contrast, Disciplinary Rules are binding on legal
professionals." Canons 4, 5 and 9 apply generally to concurrent rep-
resentation, although Disciplinary Rule 5-105 is the controlling provi-
sion."
Embedded in the Model Code is a preoccupation with maintaining
public confidence in attorneys and upholding the legal profession's
integrity." Canon 4, for instance, addresses the former by preserving
the confidences of clients, thus encouraging clients to speak freely to
their lawyers without fear of disclosure." Canon 5 addresses the latter
by imposing a duty to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client.° EC 5-1 further states that the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer should be exercised solely for the benefit of his cli-
3° PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 2 (John S. Dzien-
kowski ed., abr. ed. 2000-2001) [hereinafter PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS].
31
 Id. at 145 (noting that, in 2000, 39 states had replaced ethics codes based on Model
Code with that from Model Rules and every one of these states has in some way modified
the Model Rules provisions).
32
 See, e.g., Ex parte ArnSouth Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715, 717 (Ala. 1991) (applying the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct).
33 See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 6.
" Id. at 388.
" Id. at 389.
343 Id.
" MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, 5, 9, DR 5-105.
ss Id. Canon 1. Canon 1, for example, is entitled "A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintain-
ing the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession." Id. Furthermore, the Preamble
places the role of the attorney in the lofty context of "lawyers as guardians of the law [play-
ing] a vital role in the preservation of society." Id. at Preamble.
" Id. Canon 4.
40 Id. Canon 5.
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ent, and the interests of other clients should not "be permitted to di-
lute his loyalty to his client."41
Within this framework, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 specifically man-
dates that lawyers may not accept or continue employment if their
independent professional judgment is likely to be adversely affected
or if it would likely involve them in representing differing interests:
There is an exception if it is obvious that a lawyer could adequately
represent the interest of each client and if both consent. 43
 The con-
sent provision is important because occasionally a client will not con-
sent to the adverse representation, but the law firm or the opposing
party will believe that consent should not be necessary because there
is no real conflict." Furthermore, Canon 9 of the Model Code embod-
ies a concept courts liberally use to reject representation adverse to a
current client: "a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impro-
priety."45 This concept is increasingly rejected by Model Rules jurisdic-
tions.46
B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules deal with adverse representation against a cur-
rent client or its affiliate through Model Rule 1.7. 47 Rule 1.7 states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client, un-
less:
" Id. EC 5-1.
42
 MODEL CODE OF Pitor't. RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105.
43 Id.
" See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 12, at 93, 94 (agreeing that obtaining consent is "good
client relations" but that a problem "typically arises because the client threatened with suit
refuses to grant consent, often solely out of a desire to make life difficult for the oppo-
nent").
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 5; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
sitrn Canon 9; see, e.g., Pasman, supra note 6, at 158-59 (quoting G.A.C. Commercial
Corp. v. Mahoney Typographers, Inc., 238 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)) (noting that
appearance of impropriety standard is used to disqualify even though no ethical canons
are actually violated to maintain highest standards of professional conduct and public
respect). But see Rotunda, supra note 5, at 668 (noting that vague rule where lawyers are
reluctant to soil their reputations by risking disqualification motion favors less ethical"
lawyers who are willing to "play the lower court lottery").
46 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNnucr R. 1.9 cmt. 5. But see Drucker, supra note 14,
at 540-41 (noting that "broad language" of Model Rules still prohibits representations that
do not threaten loyalty and instead limit development of the legal profession).
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
2002]	 Current Client Conflicts of Interest
	 1209
the lawyer reasonably believes that representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
each client consents after consultation.
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's re-
sponsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
the client consents after consultation . . . . 48
The rule emphasizes that representation "directly adverse" to an-
other client is prohibited unless the lawyer reasonably believes that
the representation will not be adversely affected and each client con-
sents." The comment to Rule 1.7 states that "a lawyer ordinarily may
not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some
other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated."" On the other hand, si-
multaneous representation, in unrelated matters, of clients whose in-
terests 
 are only generally adverse instead of directly adverse, such as
competing economic enterprises, "does not require consent of the
respective clients."51 The Rules, therefore, distinguish between im-
permissible and permissible representation according to the degree
of adverse impact, emphasizing the difference between specific and
generalized, and direct and indirect adversity." Although the Model
Code's more general principles of loyalty and public confidence are
also embodied in the Model Rules, the Rules' specific guidelines allow
more leeway than the standard of the Code." Unlike the Model Code's
"appearance of impropriety" standard, where "disqualification would
become little more than a question of subjective judgment," the Rules
approach considers whether loyalty has been compromised realisti-
cally and objectively. 54
" Id.
49 Id.
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 3.
51 Id.
52 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a), R. 1.7 cum 3. Unfortunately, the
Model Rules do not define what is meant by "direct" or "indirect," leading to subsequent
attempts to define the terms. See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 677.
" See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt.
"Id. R. 1.9 cmt. 5.
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Model Rule 1.9 is also relevant to current conflicts because it re-
quires a lawyer to maintain confidentiality. 55 Although Rule 1.7's ap-
proach to current client conflicts is based on concerns of loyalty, Rule
1.9's approach to conflicts is more practical. 56 Instead of concern with
direct adversity, Rule 1.9 addresses the lawyer's duty to maintain
confidentiality both with current and former clients. 57
 Therefore,
even if Rule 1.7 is not applicable because there is no conflict or the
representation is not current, the more relaxed "substantial relation-
ship" test of Rule 1.9 must still be met before the representation is
ethical.58
 The test under Rule 1.9 is whether the current representa-
• .
non is substantially related to the representation of the former client
such that client confidences are likely to be compromised. 59
In addition, Rule 1.13 is important in that it defines who an at-
torney's client is in the case of an organization ° 0 Specifically, Rule
1.13(a) provides that: "A lawyer employed or retained by an organiza-
tion represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents."61 Therefore, its "[o] fficers, directors, employees, and
'shareholders" are not considered individual clients.°
Although both the Model Code and Model Rules prohibit adversity
to current clients, and to a lesser extent former clients, neither the
Model Code nor the Model Rules explicitly answer how representation
against the corporate affiliate of a current client should be treated.°
Furthermore, they do not address the more specific question of how
to deal with a conflict caused by the business actions of the client and
not by any transgression of the law firm. 64 The Restatement (Third) of the
35
 id. R.. 1.9.
36 See id. R. 1.7, R. 1.7 um. 3, R. 1.9.
37 See id, R. 1.9; Drucker, supra note 14, at 542.
" See Drucker, supra note 14, at 542, 543 (describing the substantial relationship test as
essentially consistent in result but that there are different approaches).
59 Id, at 542-43 (noting that Rule 1.9 not only prevents further representation when
confidences have been compromised but also does so when the attorney has been placed
in a position where confidences could be compromised); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.9; Dan S. Boyd, Current Trends in Conflict of Interest Law, 53 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 1,
3 (2001) (explaining that "virtually all of the litigation involving attempted dis-
qualifications under ... [the former client] doctrine in Texas and elsewhere in the United
States involve analysis solely or mainly of the substantial relationship test").
60 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT P.. 1.13.
61 Id. R. 1.13(a).
82 Id. R. 1.13 ant. 2.
63 See id. R. 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1983).
64.See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7; MODEL CODE or PROF.'. RESPONSIBIL-
ITY DR 5-105.
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Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"), however, provides another tool
in determining a law firm's duties in such a situation. 65
C. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
The general concern of the Restatement is that the relationship
and trust between the lawyer and the client, and the justified expecta-
tion of the client that the lawyer will be on her side, will be impacted
by allowing lawyers to be adverse in any significant way to their client's
interests. 66 Consequently, the Restatement prohibits suits brought by an
attorney against a present client.67 Additionally, this prohibition may
extend to "situations, not involving litigation, in which significant im-
pairment of a client's expectation of the lawyer's loyalty would be
[likely]."68 Such situations are likely to impair expectations of loyalty
because, although they do not involve litigation, they involve "conten-
tious" or emotional dealings. 69 This may include charges of bad faith
or transactions that involve a large part of the client's financial
worth."
The Restatement, like the Model Rules, prohibits direct adversity but
more specifically identifies what meets this standard." It emphasizes
that adversity relates not to the end result of a given case but to the
"quality of representation."72 The Restatement also concludes that gen-
eral adversity between clients is not enough; instead, the important
test is whether the relationship between the lawyer and the client is
likely to be compromised."
In addition, the Restatement goes further than the Model Rules and
provides a test to determine whether the financial and personal rela-
tionship between a client and its corporate affiliates are strong
enough that the affiliate should be treated as the client for conflict
purposes.74 These factors include: (1) whether financial loss or
benefit to the non-client corporate affiliate will have a direct, adverse
65 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 cmt. j.
66 See id. § 121 ant. b.
57 Id. § 128(2).
es Id. § 121 cmt. b.
59 Id.
70 RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 cmt. b.
71 Compare id. § 121 cmt. c(i), with MODEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
72 RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 ant c(i).
73 Id. § 121 cmt. c(iii).
74
 See id. § 121 cmt. d.
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impact on the client;75
 (2) whether the lawyer's relationship to one
client is such that another client's interests would be materially ad-
versely affected; 76 (3) whether the client enjoys significant control of
the non-client affiliate; 77 and (4) whether specific obligations such as
confidentiality are compromised." The Restatement notes that various
courts have used all, some or none of these considerations in deter-
mining whether representation without consent is permissible."
Finally, unlike the Model Code and Model Rules, the Restatement di-
rectly addresses the underlying issue of fault in concurrent adverse
representation." Under the Restatement, conflicts of interest arising
from a client merger should trigger an exception to the so called "hot
potato" rule. 81
 The hot potato rule prohibits a law firm from with-
drawing from representation of one client when the purpose is to un-
dertake representation of a new client adverse to it.82 The concern is
that law firms prohibited from undertaking a new or lucrative repre-
sentation by concurrent representation rules may try to drop a less
lucrative client like a "hot potato." 83
 By converting the current client
to a former client they would try to avoid disqualification under the
current client analysis and instead fall under the less strenuous for-
mer-client substantive relationship test." This doctrine is relevant to
the conflict of interest question because some courts have addressed
corporate family conflicts by crafting an exception to the hot potato
75 See id. § 121 cmt. d, illus. 6. A lawyer cannot undertake representation adverse to
wholly owned subsidiary of client if it would have substantial material impact felt by client.
Id, If, however, the representation is adverse to a corporation that is less than wholly owned
subsidiary of client that representation may be able to continue. hL § 121 ant. d, illus. 7.
76 kJ. § 121 cmt. d, illus. 8 (showing this would be the case if attorney relied heavily on
one client for business).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 cmt. d, illus. 9 (explaining that if an affiliate
elects a majority the directors of its family member, approves its key officers, regularly su-
pervises decisions or regularly advises it on decisions that there is significant control).
78 Id § 121 cmt. d., ant. d, illus. 10.
72 See id. § 121 Reporter's Note cmt. d.
so Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, and MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
sPoNsionzry DR 5-105, with RESTATEMENT, ROM note 19, § 121 cmt. e(v) (citing RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 ant j).
al See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 ant. j.
62
 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.16:302
(2d ed. supp. 1998).
83 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 663-64 (noting that because there is a duty of loyalty
limiting representation to current but riot to former clients, lawyers seek to avoid the ethi-
cal problem by converting the least lucrative client into a former client).
" See HAZARD, supra note 82, § 1.16:302.
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rule, allowing selective withdrawal and application of the substantive
relationship test."
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW
A. The Per Se Disqualification Rule
In 1991, in Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N.V.
Co' Heron Properties, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that representation adverse to the
corporate affiliate of a client is per se improper. 86 Stratagem involved a
motion to remove plaintiff's counsel because of a conflict of interest
in a breach of a real estate joint venture agreement case." The plain-
tiff, Stratagem Development Corporation ("Stratagem"), was repre-
sented in the action by Epstein, Becker & Green ("Epstein Becker"). 88
The defendant, Heron Properties ("Heron"), moved to disqualify Ep-
stein Becker because the firm also represented Fidelity Services Cor-
poration ("FSC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Heron, in an unre-
lated labor lawsuit and arbitration. 89
 Epstein Becker responded to
Heron's complaints that it was violating the New York Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility by withdrawing from its representation of FSC
but continuing to represent Stratagem in its dealings with Heron.°
To determine whether Epstein Becker's representation of Strata-
gem against Heron was prohibited, the court looked to Cinema 3, Ltd.
v. Cinerama, Inc. for the proposition that where there is adversity to a
current client, "the conduct `. . must be measured not so much
against the similarities in litigation, as against the duty of undivided
loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his clients.'"81 The court fur-
ther stated that this duty is equally applicable where the client is a
subsidiary of the entity being sued. 92
 The court found this especially
true in the present case where, as a wholly owned subsidiary, damages
against the subsidiary corporation "directly affect[ed] the bottom line
85 See Charles Wolfram, Legal Ethics: CorporateFami5: Conflicts, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHICS 295, 362-63 (1999).
" See 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 Re-
porter's Note cmt. d; Rotunda, supra note 5, at 658-59.
87 Stratagem, 756 F. Supp. at 790-91.
88 Id. at 789-90.
99 Id. at 790.
90 Id. at 791.
91 1d. at 792 (citing 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976)).
82 Stratagem, 756 F. Supp. at 793 (citing Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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of the corporate parent.”95
 As a result, Epstein Becker's attempt to
end the representation of FSC and avoid disqualification was ineffec-
tive."
In 1994, in Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter Bros., Inc. the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio also followed a
per se rule that prohibited adversity against the corporate affiliate of a
current client." In Cincinnati Bell, Anixter Brothers, Inc. ("Anixter"),
the defendant, moved to disqualify Frost & Jacobs as counsel for the
plaintiff, Cincinnati Bell, due to a conflict of interest.66 Frost & Jacobs
first represented Cincinnati Bell in a partnership agreement with
Anixter, which was subsequently purchased by Itel, the parent of Itel
Rail Corp. Owl Rail") 97
 Itel Rail then engaged Frost & Jacobs in un-
related litigation without either Frost & Jacobs or Itel Rail realizing
the potential for a conflict of interest with Itel Rail's sister corpora-
tion, Anixter." Frost & Jacobs subsequently instituted a suit on behalf
of Cincinnati Bell against Anixter as a result of the prior representa-
tion on the partnership agreement, still not realizing that Anixter was
the sister company of its client Itel Rail.99
 In the meantime, Itel Rail
was winding up its business and being integrated into the parent
company Ite1. 100
Interestingly, even though the conflict arose because Frost &
Jacobs failed to discover a potential conflict in its representation of
Itel Rail, and the conflict arguably could have been prevented by an
adequate conflicts check, the court characterized the conflict as one
caused by the client's business actions.lin The court further concluded
that because neither party realized the conflict, the conflict arose in-
93
 /c1, at 792. But see Rotunda, supra note 5, at 660 (criticizing Stratagem test as having
"enormous implications" because "[a] law firm could have trouble suing a corporation
(such as General Motors) if any one of the law firm's clients owned any stock in General
Motors because the liabilities (and even the potential liabilities) of General Motors affect
its bottom line").
94 Stratagem, 756 F. Supp. at 793.
95 See Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter Bros., No. C-1-93-0871, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21012, at *9 (S.D. Ohio jun. 24, 1994).
96 Id. at *4-5.
97 Id. at *7-8.
BB Id. at *8.
" Id.
1" Cincinnati Beg 1994 U.S. Din. LEXIS 21012, at *8.
101 see a at *7
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nocently.w2 But in actuality, Cincinnati Bell is factually distinct from
true no-fault conflict cases. 105
Despite finding the law firm to be without fault, the court went
on to condemn the conflict with strong words.'" The court stated,
"We cannot imagine how an attorney can maintain a duty of undi-
vided loyalty to a client, while at the same time zealously attempting to
exact millions of dollars of damages from a sister corporation." 1°5 Cin-
cinnati Bell therefore exemplifies a per se prohibition of adversity to a
current client because of the "direct effects upon the financial well-
being" of the parent company and the resulting financial impact on
the sister company. 106
 The court justified this result by interpreting
Canon 5 of the Model Code to mean that the "very threat of divided
loyalty is a basis for disqualification."107
B. Widespread Rejection of the Per Se Rule
The per se disqualification rule of Stratagem and Cincinnati Bell
has had followers, but the majority of courts have instead adopted a
more flexible test to determine whether a law firm can undertake
representation adverse to the corporate family member of a current
client without consent.108
 In fact, most cases citing Stratagem do not
apply the per se rule of disqualification but instead adopt a more
pragmatic balancing test.'" In addition, the cases on which Stratagem
relies only weakly support a per se rule in corporate family conflicts. 110
The American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility ("Committee") directly addressed the question
1°2 See id. at *8.
1°3
 Compare id., with Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1127 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (noting that the conflict was created by a client acquisition of another corpo-
ration after the law suit had begun).
1" Cincinnati Bell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21012, at *9.
1°5 See id.
1°6 See id,
lo Id. at *9-10 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 271 (D. Del.
1980)).
108 See, e.g., RESTATEMEIgt, supra note 19, at § 121 Reporter's Note ant. cl (commenting
that most cases and Restatement reject per se rule and look at direct impact of the adver-
sity on representation); Sacksteder, supra note 9, at 749 (noting that per se rule prohibit-
ing representation against the corporate affiliate of a client has followers but majority ap-
proach is more flexible one that looks at the facts and circumstances); see also Rotunda,
supra note 5, at 669 (criticizing the Stratagem line of cases).
1°9 See, e.g., Colorpix Sys. of Am. v. Broan Mfg. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 331, 336 (D. Conn.
2001).
110 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 667.
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of whether a lawyer who represents a corporate client may represent
another client adverse to the affiliate of that corporate client in an
unrelated manner. 111
 Their Opinion rejected the application of a per
se rule in a corporate affiliate conflict situation, regardless of whether
the affiliate is wholly-owned or has a more tenuous ownership connec-
tion with the original client. 112
 The test is not affiliation itself, but
whether the circumstances of the client-lawyer relationship are such
that the client has a reasonable expectation, known to the law firm,
that its affiliate will be treated as a client for conflicts purposes.'"
Moreover, the Opinion clarifies that Model Rule 1.7(a) applies
only if two conditions are met.'" First, the corporate affiliate must be
considered a client." Second, the representation must be directly
adverse.'" If both conditions are met, the representation is prohib-
ited unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will
not be adversely affected and both clients consent. 117
If the corporate affiliate is not considered a client, then Rule
1.7(b) is applicable.'" Under Rule 1.7(b), if a lawyer's representation
of a client may be materially limited by the lawyer's duties to another
person or entity, such as an affiliate of another client, the lawyer is
prohibited from accepting the representation.'" An exception is al-
lowed if the attorney obtains consent from the client whose represen-
tation may be materially limited and the lawyer reasonably believes
that the representation will not be adversely affected.' 2°
To determine whether the corporate affiliate is also a client, the
Committee stated that although the Model Rules could be interpreted
otherwise, Rule 1.13 includes a presumption that an organization is
considered separate from its constituents for conflict of interest pur-
poses. 12' Whether the affiliate is considered a client thus depends on
the particular circumstances of the relationship, and is a matter of
implied or express contract. 122
 If, however, the client has an expecta-
111 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
112 id.
113 id.
114 See Id.
113 id.
116 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
ID See id.
118	 see MODEL Ruts or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b).
112 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
1" MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) .
121 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
122 See id. An agreement could be in the form of an explicit letter of engagement, or
could come about as a result of reasonable expectations on the part of the client and the
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don that corporate affiliates will be protected as clients from adverse
representation, the Committee believes that lawyers who perform
only a limited role for the client should not be expected to be current
on all corporate affiliations and that the burden is on the client to
keep the lawyer informed. 123
 Therefore, the Committee stated that a
lawyer who has no reason to know of the conflict will not necessarily
violate the ethics rules by accepting new representation without client
consent. 124
To determine whether the particular circumstances indicate a
client relationship with the affiliate, the Committee examined
whether the nature of the lawyer's dealings was intended to benefit all
subsidiaries and involved obtaining confidential information from
these subsidiaries. 125
 Adverse representation against a corporate
affiliate may be particularly problematic when the lawyer has had ac-
cess to confidential information through her previous work for the
corporate client that could be used against the affiliate. 126 In addition,
if the relationship is more attenuated, the affiliate could still be con-
sidered a client if the lawyer-client relationship is such that the
affiliate reasonably believes that it is a client. 127
 This is exemplified
where the legal teams of the affiliate and the corporate client are
closely linked. 128 Finally, a lawyer may be required to consider a cli-
ent's affiliate as a client when the two corporations are alter-egos. 126
An alter-ego is characterized by a disregard of corporate formalities or
a complete overlap of management and board of directors. 13°
Significantly, a mere economic impact on the affiliate that results
in an economic impact on the corporate client, does not warrant dis-
qualification. 131
 While it directly impacts a non-client, the affiliate, the
subsequent actions of the lawyer in failing to dispel or disagree with such expectations. Id.
The committee relies heavily on a tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers, which provides that a lawyer-client relationship is created when a person
indicates that they require legal services and the lawyer somehow indicates consent to
provide those services or fails to indicate lack of consent when he knows or should know
that the prospective client reasonably expects such services. See id.
1" Id.
124
 Id. (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264,266 (D. Del. 1980)).
123 see is
126 See Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
127 See id.
1" Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. Note that this formulation of the alter-ego analysis is often broader than that
used in corporate law. See Wolfram, supra note 85, at 347-48.
Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
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representation is only indirectly adverse to the client.' 32 Finally, the
Committee noted Rule 1.7(b) limits the lawyer's representation where
a lawyer cannot recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action because of other responsibilities or loyalties. 133 Here the Com-
mittee worries that the attorney's concern for pleasing one client
might compromise his professional judgment in advising another cli-
ent. 134
The Opinion also advises a law firm to clarify which of its clients'
corporate affiliates are to be considered its clients for conflicts of in-
terest purposes from the onset of the representation.'" This under-
standing is not, however, mandatory.'"
The dissents to the Opinion are concerned that the majority de-
parted from the traditional interpretation of the Model Rules and
shifted the burden of protection from the lawyer to the client in re-
quiring it to bargain for protection of its affiliates.'" Furthermore, the
dissenters believe that considering economic impact as merely indi-
rect conflict is an inaccurate portrayal of the business world.'" In-
deed, the dissent states that outside the Fortune 500, most companies
would find a suit that imposed economic harm as a clear conflict of
interest.'"
In 2001, in Colorpix Systems v. Broan Manufacturing Co., the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, consistent with
the ABA Ethics Opinion, as well as the dominant approach in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejected the
per se rule.m Defendant Broan Manufacturing Co. ("Broan") moved
to disqualify the law firm of Robinson & Cole ("R&C") from repre-
senting the plaintiff, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of Illi-
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
133 Id.
136 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8.
131 See id. (Allister, dissenting). But see Romansic, supra note 7, at 311 (claiming that
corporations have no choice but to bargain for firms to recognize their affiliates as clients
and firms can respond with higher fees representing lost opportunities).
158 Formal Op. 390, supra note 8 (Fox, dissenting).
"9 Id. (Amster, dissenting). The dissents feel that distinguishing subsidiaries, particu-
larly wholly owned subsidiaries, from divisions, for example, ignores the legal and other
requirements that may force such a distinction. Id. They feel that the majority puts the
responsibility of protection on the client, sacrificing smaller business that may not be as
savvy as Fortune 500 companies that can clearly negotiate the scope of every representa-
tion. Id,
149 Colorpix Sys. v. Broan Mfg. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 331,336 (D. Conn. 2001).
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nois ("Travelers"), because R&C represented Broan's parent com-
pany, Nortek, Inc., in a prior suit. 141 The Colorpix case, unlike Strata-
gem, involved a former client relationship, but the issue of whether
Broan was a client of R&C for conflicts of interest purposes still
arose.142
 The court noted that Broan was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Nortek and that a significant share of Nortek's business was com-
prised of Broan and Nordyne, Inc., another wholly-owned subsidi-
ary."5
 In addition, Broan and Nordyne shared a legal department,
management personnel and business strategy. 144
 The court stated that
whether there is a former or current client relationship, and whether
the client is traditional or attenuated, is immaterial for purposes of
the conflicts of interest standard. 145
 To determine whether Broan was
a client of R&C, the court asked whether there were "sufficient as-
pects" of a traditional client relationship to trigger protection, not
whether there was actually such a relationship." 6
The Colorpix court did not interpret Stratagem to require a per se
test. 147 Instead, it cited Stratagem for the proposition that financial im-
pact "weighs in favor of finding a conflict of interest." According to
Colorpix, elements of the "facts and circumstances" test include the
level of control over the subsidiaries' litigation, coordinated business
strategy, and whether the entities are alter-egos of one another be-
cause they share management and legal departments. 149 The court
concluded that because Broan was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nor-
141 Id. at 333.
142 Id at 336 n.l. Interestingly, the court analyzes the conflict of interest question tin-
der the more lenient former client standard even though R&C represented Nortek while
at the same time suing Broan in the Colorpix case. See id. The court concludes that the for-
mer client standard is warranted, perhaps because R&C did not impermissibly drop a cli-
ent like a "hot potato" but because the Nortek representation ended naturally when the
opposing party withdrew its complaint. See id.
143 Id, at 337.
144
148 See Colorpix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
148 Id.
147 see
148 Id.
149 Id. at 336-38. Colorpix relies heavily on Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. u Hotel of
Gainesville Assoc. See id. at 336, 337, 338. The court in Ramada recognized differing ap-
proaches as to whether an affiliated entity is protected, but looked to a pragmatic line of
cases that focused not on "labels" but instead on the "facts and circumstances" involved.
988 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (N.D.Ga. 1991). The court found that because the three compa-
nies involved, all had "substantially similar management" personnel, shared the same
headquarters, and had the same corporate philosophies and shared a single legal depart-
ment, there was sufficient "identity of interest" among them to consider there to be a
conflict of interest. Id. at 1465.
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tek and comprised a substantial share of Nortek's business, any claim
against Broan would directly and adversely affect Nortek's "bottom
line." Furthermore, the connection between the legal departments
and sharing of corporate management personnel and business phi-
losophy meant Broan had a sufficient attorney-client relationship with
R&C to create a potential conflict.'"
In 1989, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
again applied the facts and circumstances test developed in the Sec-
ond Circuit. 152
 To determine whether there was a traditional client
relationship requiring disqualification, the Hartford court considered
whether the parent and subsidiary were distinct and separate entities
for the purposes of legal representation. 153 In Hartford, the court con-
cluded there was a traditional relationship because the general coun-
sel of the parent retained a supervisory role over the subsidiary.'"
The court, however, also found that the relationship was not a con-
tinuing one, such that the less stringent substantial relationship test
could be applied to determine disqualification.'55 The court also
found an exception to the "hot-potato" doctrine, which prohibits ap-
plying the less stringent former-client conflict test when a law firm
drops a client, was warranted in Hartford because the law firm did not
drop its client.' 56
 Instead, the client's long-time lawyer merely left the
firm with the client in tow.'" Therefore, the less stringent test was ap-
plied by the court and disqualification was ultimately unnecessary.'"
As shown, the preferred approach of most courts to a corporate
family conflict is a balancing of the facts and circumstances. 159 In
these cases, presumption of loyalty to a client's affiliate is rejected and
adversity to the corporate affiliate of a client is treated as merely indi-
155 Colorpix, 131 F. Supp.2d at 337.
151 Id. (noting Broan and Nortek shared the same vice president, secretary and general
counsel).
152 721 F. Supp. 534,538 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
155
 Id. at 539-40.
154 Hartford Accident e.,.e kiden, '721 F. Supp. at 539-40.
155 id.
156 Id. at 540-41.
157 Id. The client, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds) left the firm of Murphy
& Mitchell, P.C. for LeBoeuf when attorney Donald J. Wood changed firms. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity, 721 F. Supp. at 536. When Wood left LeRoeuf Reynolds also Ieft. Id. at
541.
155
 Id. at 541-42.
15° See supra notes 108-158 and accompanying text.
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rect. 160 Instead, the courts look to the relationship between the client
and the law firm, and the client and its affiliate, to determine if there
are enough similarities to a traditional client relationship that the
same loyalty concerns are raised and the same strict duties should be
imposed. 161
III. CONFLICTS CAUSED BY THE CLIENT
Within the complex framework of current conflicts of interest,
some cases address a conflict that arises through the actions of the
client and not through those of the law firm. 162
 There is, however,
considerable disagreement as to how this element should work into
the basic framework of either the per se or the balancing tests. 163
There are three basic approaches to the problem. 1" The first two ap-
proaches developed in the case law, one following from the per se
framework of Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N.V. &
Heron Properties, Inc.,' 65
 the second from the cases that reject a per se
conflict rule in the corporate family situation. 166 The third approach
has no case support and originates from a strict reading of the Re-
statement. 167 All three approaches, even the per se test, address the
fault issue by incorporating a balancing test, but differ in how this test
is applied.
A. Gould: A Per Se Approach with a Balancing Test Exception
The first approach seen in the case law deals with the problem of
a no-fault conflict that arises when the court uses the per se conflict
rule seen in Stratagem. 16° This approach was used by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1990 in Gould, Inc.
v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co. 169 Gould has been widely cited to sup-
port an exception to the hot potato rule when a current conflict is
leo See supra notes 108-158 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 108-158 and accompanying text.
162 See infra notes 168-278 and accompanying text.
163 See infra notes 168-278 and accompanying text.
164 See infra notes 168-278 and accompanying text.
tss See infra notes 168-192 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 195-267 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 268-278 and accompanying text.
16s See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (N.D.
Ohio 1990).
169 See a
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caused by client acdon. 178
 The per se rule is applied and dis-
qualification is presumed, but a second step mitigates this strict rule
by allowing withdrawal if the facts and circumstances warrant. 171
 In
other words, a conflict is presumed but the law firm has the option to
drop either client at its own discretion if it was not at fault. 172 Once
the law firm is allowed to convert the problem client into a former
client the conflict is then analyzed under the more permissive stan-
dard for former client conflicts. 173
In Gould, the plaintiff, Gould, Inc., was represented by the law
firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue ("Jones, Day") against multiple de-
fendants including Pechiney and Trefimetaux ("Pechiney") . 174 Pechi-
ney moved to disqualify Jones, Day as Gould's counsel because of two
conflicts of interest created by a complex sequence of events includ-
ing a law firm merger and a client acquisition. 178
 In 1985, Gould filed
suit against Pechiney with Jones, Day as local counsel.176
 In 1987,
Pechiney, which had been represented by McDougall, Hersh & Scott
in patent matters wholly unrelated to the suit at hand, became a client
of Jones, Day as a result of the merger of the law firms of McDougall,
Hersh & Scott and Jones, Day. 177
 In addition, in 1989 Pechiney ac-
quired 1G Technologies Inc. ("IGT"), which Jones, Day represented in
numerous matters unrelated to the suit against Pechiney. 178
 Thus, af-
ter the acquisition, Jones, Day was put in the position of suing Pechi-
ney, the parent company of its client IGT. 08
 Pechiney claimed that
Jones, Day should be disqualified because of the conflicts. 18°
In approaching the issue, the Gould court considered two ques-
tions. 181
 First, whether Jones, Day violated Canon 5 of the Model Code,
and, second, if such a violation occurred, whether disqualification was
necessary. 182
 The court, applying a per se approach, stated that suing
170 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 Reporter's Note cmt. j; HAZARD, supra note
82, § 1.7:207.
171 Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127.
178 Id.
173 See generally id at 1128.
174
 Id at 1122.
175
 Id. at 1123-24.
1" Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1122-23.
177
178 Id. at 1123.
178 Id. at 1123-24.
180
181 Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
182 Id.
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a client's corporate affiliate was the same as suing the client itself. 183
The court then concluded that consent to the conflict was required
not only by Gould but also by Pechiney, the non-client and parent of
the client IGT. 184
Yet, while it applied a per se rule, the court also recognized the
conflict was caused by the client not the law firm. 185 The court there-
fore created a second step in the analysis, asking whether there
should actually be disqualification, or whether the remedy of selective
withdrawal (an exception to the hot potato rule) would be appropri-
ate. 186 The court advocated a balancing approach to take into account
the changing corporate environment and increasing merger activ-
ity.187 In applying this balancing test, the Gould court found that judi-
cial integrity was not threatened because, among other factors, no in-
formation or confidences were compromised and Pechiney created
the conflict by acquiring IGT after the suit had commenced. 188 There-
fore, while the first prong of the test in Gould is a per se dis-
qualification rule, it is softened by allowing an exception under the
second prong: a balancing of the facts and circumstances, including
the law firm's fault.189
Although Gould has spurred a line of cases applying some version
of an exception to the hot potato rule, most cases do not actually
seem to use a two step test. 19° Instead, they skip the per se analysis and
use a facts and circumstances test that considers the fault of the law
firm as one element. 191
 This is consistent with the widespread rejec-
tion of a per se approach discussed earlier. 192
B. Facts and Circumstances Test
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and
Ninth Circuits all favor some type of a balancing test over a per se
standard to determine whether corporate family members should be
1°2
 Id. at 1125.
184 Id. at 1126.
185 Id. at 1127.
186 Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
11.87
lee Id. at 1126-27.
189 Id.
190 See infra notes 193-267 and accompanying text.
191 See infra notes 193-267 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 108-158 and accompanying text.
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considered the same client for current conflict purposes.'" In prac-
tice, per se jurisdictions treat corporate affiliates as the same client,
and therefore automatically remedy a conflict through dis-
qualification or withdrawal.'" To determine whether disqualification
or withdrawal is appropriate, courts implement a balancing test. 195 In
contrast, in jurisdictions that favor the second "facts and circum-
stances" approach, the test has only one step. 196 This step is a balanc-
ing test where the law firm's lack of fault is merely one factor to con-
sider in determining whether the law firm should be disqualified,
forced to withdraw, or whether representation can continue. 197
In 1980, the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware decided Pennwalt Carp. tt PThugh. 198
 Plaintiff Pennwalt Corpora-
tion's ("Pennwalt") counsel, Dechert, Price & Rhoads ("Dechert")
also currently represented the defendant's sister corporation, Scholl,
Inc., in an unrelated suit.'" Dechert continuously represented Penn-
walt in litigation matters starting in 1956.2" In 1977, Pennwalt began
considering a law suit against Plough. 201
 In 1978, Dechert became the
defense counsel for Scholl in an unrelated anti-trust case 202
 In 1979,
Schering-Plough, the parent company of Plough, acquired Scholl as a
wholly-owned subsidiary.205
 Approximately one month later, Dechert
instituted the lawsuit against Plough on behalf of Pennwalt, and only
later became aware of the corporate relationship.204
Dechert was allowed to withdraw from representing Scholl, leav-
ing the court to consider Plough's attempt to disqualify it from repre-
senting Pennwalt.205
 Plough urged a per se rule of disqualification be-
cause any action against it would necessarily harm its affiliate
193 See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344 MHP ENE, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8363, *10, 15 ( Jun. 6, 1991); Hartford Accident & Indent. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, 85 F.R.D. 264,
272(D. Del. 1980); Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
App. 4th 248, 253 (1997).
194 See, e.g., Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127.
198 See id. at 1126-27.
198 Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 269.
197 See id. at 269, 272.
198 Id. at 264.
199 1d. at 266.
298
 Id. at 265.
20 Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 265.
298 Id.
898 Id. at 266.
294 Id. Note once Dechert was aware of the conflict it failed to inform its clients. Id,
298 Id. at 267.
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Schol1.206
 In contrast, Dechert argued that because it never repre-
sented either Plough or Schering-Plough there was no ethical duty
implicated in being adverse to thern.2°7 Furthermore, Dechert argued
that the conflict was the fault of Schering-Plough because it was cre-
ated by its purchase of Schol1.208
The court analyzed the issues under a Model Code framework and
rejected the positions of both parties. 20° The court rejected the per se
rule because neither Schering-Plough nor Plough were clients of De-
chert and all the companies were distinct legal entities. 210 Instead, the
court used the facts and circumstances test to determine if the ulti-
mate objectives of the Code, undivided loyalty and confidentiality, were
violated.211
 To determine whether there is a threat to loyalty, a court
following Pennwalt should consider the relationship between the sister
corporations to determine to what degree the representation of one
client may be influenced by a regard for the other client.212 The
Pennwalt court concluded that there was no threat of disloyalty be-
cause the conflict arose significantly after the actions began.213 Al-
though Scholl and Plough were in the process of merging their per-
sonnel and operations, including their legal departments, these
changes had not yet taken place at the time of Dechert's withdrawal
from representing Schol1214 Therefore, under the formula in Penn-
walt, the integration of the legal departments and a close structural
relationship between the sister companies could implicate loyalty. 215
More interestingly, it was important to the court's analysis that the
conflict arose through the actions of one of the clients and not the
law firm.216 The court ultimately concluded that there was no threat
to loyalty and no conflict, such that Dechert's withdrawal never impli-
cated the hot potato rule.217
 Importantly, Dechert had to withdraw
because of the impending conflict created as the legal departments of
Scholl and Schering-Plough merged. 218
 Implicitly, if there had been
2°6 Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 268.
207 Id,
208 id,
2°9 Id.
210 Id. at 268-69.
211 Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 269.
212 Id. at 271-72.
213 id,
214 id
215 See id. at 272.
216 Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 272.
217 Id. at 272-73.
218 See id. at 272.
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no such operational integration then withdrawal might not have been
necessary.219
The Second Circuit has a well-defined approach that uses a simi-
lar balancing test for the current conflict of interest question. 220 If the
law firm is adverse to a "traditional client," or if the legal relationship
is a continuing one, a strict prima facie rule against representation is
applied.221
 if the client is neither traditional nor continuing then it
can be treated as a former client and the more permissive substantial
relationship test is applied. 222
 Most courts then look at factors such as
links between the affiliates in terms of management and legal deci-
sion-making to determine if they are separate entities or should be
considered one traditional client, 223 Courts consider whether the law
firm was at fault as relevant to whether the relationship is con tinu-
ing.224
 Therefore, like in Pennwalt and the second step of Gould, al-
though it is normally unacceptable to terminate a client relationship
after a conflict arises and then use a more lenient conflicts test, courts
will allow this exception to the hot potato rule where the facts and
circumstances warrant 11025
 Namely, an exception to the hot potato
doctrine is allowed when the client and its affiliate are not so closely
connected that they should be treated as one client, and where the
conflict is not the fault of the law firM.226
This approach was followed in 2000, in University of Rochester 1.4
G.D. Searle & Co., where the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of New York balanced the facts and circumstances and
determined that disqualification was not warranted. 227 In this case, a
law firm represented the University of Rochester against the subsidi-
ary of its client Pharmacia because of Pharmacia's subsequent merger
with Upjohn and Monsanto, to whom Searle previously was related. 228
The court used a balancing test, considering several factors including
the unexpected nature of the merger that caused the conflict, and
that substantial work had been done by the firm prior to the
219 See
220 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indent., 721 F. Supp. at 538.
221
 See id.
222 See id. at 539.
22 See, e.g., id, at 540; Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 272.
224 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 00-CV-61611.(13), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19030, *26-27 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000).
225 See, e.g., Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127; Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 272.
226
 See, e.g., Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127; Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 272.
?iv See 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *22, 25.
228 id at *9, 10.
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irnerger.229 Attempting to avoid the hot potato rule, the law firm with-
drew from the prior representation for the merged company and
claimed that this cured its conflict."' The court agreed that an excep-
tion was warranted, citing several factors in support of withdrawal."'
These factors included the conflict created by a client business deci-
sion, and the law firm's prompt reaction to the conflict once it was
discovered.232
This approach can also be seen in In n Wingspread Corp., where
the trustee of Wingspread Corporation and its subsidiaries sought to
retain Hahn & Hessen as its counsel against NCNB National Bank of
North Carolina ("NCNB"). 255 The parent of NCNB, NationsBank
Corporation ("NationsBank"), sought to disqualify Hahn & Hessen
because Hahn Sc Hessen was counsel for Citizens, a NationsBank sub-
sidiary, in unrelated matters."' The conflict was created by a merger
that made NationsBank the parent company of both NCNB and Citi-
zens.235 Due to the merger, Hahn & Hessen was representing one sis-
ter company of the NationsBank family while suing another. 26 The
court first asked whether the relationship between Hahn & Hessen
and NationsBank was attenuated and vicarious or a traditional client
relationship.257 The court considered that Hahn & Hessen never rep-
resented NationsBank or any other subsidiaries before the merger,
and after the merger continued to represent only Citizens as a sepa-
rate entity from NationsBank. 2" Furthermore, NationsBank's ex-
tended corporate structure sufficiently distanced NationsBank from
Hahn & Hessen.2" The court also looked to whether the representa-
tion was current, and found that there was minimal work, only ap-
proximately eight hours, done for Citizens since the dismissal of the
last case.240 The court noted that withdrawal is usually not allowed to
cure a current conflict."' In this case, however, the more lenient sub-
229 See id, at *21-30.
239 Id. at *27.
251 Id. at *21-30.
252 Uniu of Rochester  2000 U.S. Diet. LEM 19030, at *29.
253 152 B.R. 861, 862 (Bairiki .. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
234 Id. at 862.
255 Id at 862-63.
259 Id.
07 Id. at 863-64.
238 In to Wingspread, 152 B.R. at 864.
239 a
249 Id at 865.
241
 Id. at 864.
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stantial relationship test was appropriate because the conflict was cre-
ated by a client action after representation commenced.242
In Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., a 1991 case decided by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
the court used an "alter-ego" test to determine whether corporate
affiliates were to be treated as the same client for conflicts purposes. 243
The alter-ego approach in Teradyne has significant similarities to the
balancing approach. 244 The court found that the intimate connection
between the two affiliates made them alter-egos. 245 The connections
between the two affiliates included supervision of legal work for the
subsidiary by the parent's legal department, regular instructions to
the subsidiary's law firm by the parent corporation's management,
the direction of correspondence and billing by the subsidiary's law
firm to the parent, and the full integration of most of the subsidiary's
employees and business to the parent company. 245 The court found
this significant identity of legal interest key in finding the companies
to be alter-egos of one another for conflicts purposes.247
In 1991, in Ex parte AmSouth Bank, NA., the Supreme Court of
Alabama addressed the issue of concurrent adverse representation
not created by the law firm. 2" The plaintiff, AmSouth, attempted to
disqualify counsel for defendant, Drummond Company, Inc. 249 In
1990, AmSouth approached Arnold & Porter to represent it in some
transactional undertakings. 250 Three months later, Arnold & Porter
was retained by Drummond in regards to a suit by a minority stock-
holder of ABC who complained of a merger process. 2" AmSouth was
trustee for a number of trusts that held ABC stock, and sued Drum-
mond two months later,252 Arnold & Porter decided to withdraw from
its representation of AniSouth but continued to represent Drum-
mond.253 The parties stipulated that Arnold & Porter's work for
242 Id. at 865.
243 Teradyne, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8363, *10-11.
244 See supra notes 193-267 and accompanying text.
245 Teradyne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8363, at *14-16.
246 /d. at *10-12.
247 See id. at *14-15. But see Wolfram, supra note 85, at 346 (criticizing alter-ego formula
because in "[wlrenching the alter ego notion out of the fraud-prevention context for pur-
poses of determining whether a client-lawyer conflict exists risks serious distortion").
249 Ex parteAmSouth Bank, NA, 589 So. 2d 715,719 (Ala. 1991).
2" Id. at 716
250 Id.
251 Id
2 Id at 716-17.
AmSouth Bank, 589 So. 2d at 717.
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Drummond in the case was unrelated to its prior transactional work
for A1nSouth.254 The court then found that there was no threat to
confidentiality. 255
Although this case did not involve corporate family conflicts, but
rather the more stringent rules of a traditional conflict, the court
gives an enlightening consideration of a conflict caused by the subse-
quent actions of the clients and not the law firm. 256 The court found
that although lawyers ordinarily cannot shift from a Rule 1.7 (current
client) to a Rule 1.9 (former client) test by dropping a client as
Arnold & Porter did, the conflict was caused by AmSouth's suit, not
by the law firm.257
 The court acknowledged the hot potato rule but
distinguished it from the facts of the case, holding that Arnold & Por-
ter could permissibly drop one of its clients because the conflict was
not its fault and disqualification would be unfair. 258
 The court also
noted that Arnold & Porter sought a waiver as soon as the conflict be-
came apparent, and that the decision to withdraw from one client and
not the other was made after careful consideration of its duty of loy-
alty to both clients.259
In conclusion, the elements of the facts and circumstances test
have varied when applied by different courts. 266 However, the most
common elements include: prejudice to one of the parties from los-
ing its chosen representation;261 financial impact on the traditional
client;262 the importance the traditional client affiliate places on the
litigation including supervision of the litigation; 263 "identity of inter-
est" between the corporate affiliates including sharing personnel,
management, and legal departments;264 whether the law firm was at
Id.
263 See id. at 718.
06 See id. at 719.
257 id,
us See Am South Bank, 589 So. 2d at 719-20.
259 Id, at 719,
"0 See supra notes 19-267 and accompanying text.
251 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 685-86 (noting that in Gould, although the law firm
acted inappropriately in failing to either obtain consent or notify its clients of the conflict,
disqualification was not wananted because of the balance of time and money and lack of
fault).
262 See Wolfram, supra note 85, at 358.
263 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 685 (noting that if "the same people act for both [enti-
ties] in retaining and actively supervising the outside lawyer" it is an important factor to
consider in determining" whether corporate formalities should be ignored).
266
 See id. at 684-85 (suggesting It may be appropriate to pierce the corporate veil" in
an ethics issue "when the parent corporation has an integrated legal department with simi-
lar personnel"); Wolfram, supra note 85, at 358-59 (emphasizing the operational issues
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fault in creating the conflict;265
 and whether the law firm reacted
promptly and appropriately upon discovering the conflict. 266 These
elements all directly address loyalty concerns, and ensure that the
balancing test appropriately considers all factors that weigh towards
disqualification, withdrawal, or continued representation in a corpo-
rate affiliate conflict situation. 267
C. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
In comparison to the two case law approaches towards no-fault
conflicts, the Restatement approach, read literally, is less flexible in its
treatment of fault. 268 The Restatement is valuable in that it explicitly
spells out a balancing test to determine whether two affiliates should
be treated as the same client such that there is a conflict.269 The bal-
ancing test involves considering four factors: (1) whether financial
loss or benefit to the non-client corporate affiliate will have a direct,
adverse impact on the client;2" (2) whether the lawyer's relationship
to one client is such that another client's interests would be adversely
affected;271
 (3) whether the client enjoys significant control of the
non-client affiliate;272
 and (4) whether specific obligations such as
confidentiality are compromised. 275
 This approach is similar to the
facts and circumstances test developed in the case law and to the bal-
ancing test that is the second step of Gould.274 The fault element of
the test does not, however, seem to be part of this balancing test. 276
The comment to Section 132 instead seems to indicate that if the
conflict was not the fault of the law firm then there is an automatic
exception to the finding of a conflict under the balancing test. 276 In-
deed, this is the interpretation of the court in University of Rochester
involved when there is shared management but questioning the importance of shared
legal departments).
265 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 686.
266 See id.
267 See Gould, 738 F. Supp at 1126.
266 Compare Gould, 738 F. Supp at 1127, and Uniu of Rochester, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19030, at *27-30, with RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 cant. j.
269 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 ant. d.
270 See id., § 121 ant. d, illus. 6.
271 Id. § 121 cmt. d, illus. 8.
272 Id. § 121 ant. d, illus. 9.
275 Id.
274 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 cmt. d, with Gould, 738 F. Supp. at
1127-28, and Pennwalt, 85 F.R.D. at 271-72.
275 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 121 cmt. d.
276 Id. § 132 cmt. j.
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where the court looked to the Restatement but explicitly rejected its
implication that there is an automatic exception. 277
 Instead, the court
chose to use the no-fault element as merely one element of the bal-
ancing test.278
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Per Se Rule or the Balancing Test ,
The preferred approach in addressing corporate family conflicts
is one that looks at the facts and circumstances involved and deter-
mines whether ethical concerns are actually implicated 2 79 This
method is superior to a per se approach because it is practical instead
of theoretical.28° A flexible approach that looks at the facts and cir-
cumstances instead of automatically treating corporate affiliates as
one client is more consistent with corporate formalities. 28' It also ap-
propriately considers loyalty concerns by imposing disqualification, a
harsh burden on the client's resources and right to counsel, only
when there is an actual, not an imagined, threat to the integrity of the
profession.282
 Finally, using a balancing of the facts and circumstances
that includes the fault of the law firm, instead of the per se approach
or the Restatement approach, renders an appropriate result that
reflects actual loyalty concerns. 283
A per se rule ignores corporate legal norms by treating corporate
affiliates of a client as the same entity as the client itself. 284 The per se
rule allows a corporation to acquire a subsidiary, retain the protection
of limited liability created by the corporate form, but at the same time
277
 Univ. of Roclulter, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *29-30.
278 Id.
278
 See Sacksteder, supra note 9, at 764 (arguing that per se rule inappropriately uses
too broad a view of loyalty for the modern legal profession because it incorporates more
thorough-going loyalty as a person" versus loyalty in the performance of a role").
280 See supra notes 168-267 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 284-290 and accompanying text.
282
 See infra notes 291-301 and accompanying text.
283 See infra notes 302-326 and accompanying text.
284
 Rotunda, supra note 5, at 655-56 (noting that under corporate law each member of
a corporate family is treated separately except in the extremely rare case of veil piercing
but this is opposite conflict of interest rules which routinely ignore corporate formalities).
But see Wolfram, supra note 85, at 348-49 (asking why business decisions about corporate
form having nothing to do with the retention of lawyers should control the scope of loy-
alty).
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ignore any disadvantages in the realm of legal ethics say Notably, if the
affiliate had chosen not to take advantage of a corporate family struc-
ture and had simply treated the acquisition as a new department, for
instance, it would receive the full protection of client loya1ty. 286 Fur-
thermore, in a conflict between the client and the affiliate the law
firm's duty of loyalty would clearly be with the client.287 The per se
rule is therefore inconsistent with standard treatment of corporate
affiliates as separate entities.288 Additionally, corporate affiliate
conflicts arise in regards to sophisticated clients with complex legal
structures.289 A strict per se rule ignores the ability of large corpora-
tions with extensive affiliate structures to protect themselves by nego-
tiating representation for their affiliates. 29°
Over-zealous disqualification, which can come from a per se rule,
also ignores a number of important values."' This can lead to an un-
duly formalistic result, out of touch with reality, and ultimately un-
dermining public confidence in the legal profession . 292 A per se rule
undervalues the client's right to representation of its choice 2 9S In
contrast, a more flexible approach correctly recognizes that dis-
qualification is a serious remedy and a hardship on the party whose
attorney is being disqualified. 294 This is true in terms of both time
288 Rotunda, supra note 5, at 670 (criticizing rule which allows large corporations to
create separate subsidiaries when it suits their purposes as well as to retain the benefits of
being a single entity for disqualifying opposing counsel).
286 See id.
297 Id. (noting "for every purpose (except, apparently, for purposes of the law of
conflicts) the law treats parents, subsidiaries, and sister corporations as separate and dis-
tinct legal entities").
258 See id.
288 See id. at 672.
222 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 672-73. But see Wolfram, supra note 85, at 349-50
(criticizing rule that relies on agreements to protect clients because it may shift responsi-
bility for addressing conflicts from the attorney to the client).
291 See Boyd, supra note 59, at 23.
222 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (noting over disqualification encourages "vexatious tactics and increased cyni-
cism by the public").
2" See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *15
(W.D.N.Y Dec. 11, 2000) (noting that disqualification is disfavored because it harms a cli-
ent by separating him from his chosen counsel); Pasman, supra note 6, at 173 (noting that
each attorney-client relationship is unique and that the "bond of trust that develops be-
tween them should not be severed lightly"); Wolfram, supra note 85, at 327 (commenting
on the importance of long-standing counsel who know ... [the clients] affairs expertly
and who can quickly and efficiently focus on the client's particular legal needs").
294 See Wolfram, supra note 85, at 363 (praising exception to the hot potato rule be-
cause of burden of changing counsel after the representation had begun and the impor-
tance of attorney choice).
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considerations as well as the financial expense of retaining and orient-
ing new representation on a case that may be complicated or techni-
cal."5 Furthermore, a client could consider its long time counsel's
rejection of representation as much a betrayal as undertaking
conflicting representation.2 Finally, the attorney's right to practice is
also a value ignored by the per se rule; one that has increasing impli-
cations as the opportunities for conflict situations grow." 7
In contrast, a test that balances the facts and circumstances allows
for a more practical and less formalistic approach to identifying
conflicts of interest, and disregards the corporate form only when
public policy reasons demand it.298 Such a practical approach, focus-
ing on real and concrete threats to loyalty, protects loyalty and judicial
integrity while refusing to undermine other values equally important
to the integrity of the profession under the guise of protecting it. It
is true that allowing conflicts of interest to continue unchecked will
harm the integrity of the legal profession and foster negative percep-
tions by the public. 3" However, a formalistic rule that imposes the
burdens of disqualification on parties when the motion stems from
litigation tactics not ethical concerns will likewise harm the integrity
of the profession."'
B. The Roth Of Fault in Conflicts of Interest
Whether a law firm is at fault in creating a current conflict, or
whether it was created by business actions of a client, should always be
an element in determining disqualification. 302
 The fault of the law
firm should be considered because it is directly related to concerns of
loyalty.345
 After all, if there is no fault on the part of the law firm then
there is no ethical misconduct, no action to sanction, and no poten-
295
•
296 See Susan Shapiro, Symposium Case Studies in Legal Ethics: Everesu of the Mundane:
Conflicts of Interest in Real-World Legal Practice, 69 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1139, 1143 (2000) (not-
ing that long-standing clients may see the refusal to take on representation as breach of
loyalty).
297 See Drucker, supra note 14, at 535.
298 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 683-84.
299 See Drucker, supra note 14, at 557-58.
309 See, e.g., Formal Op. 390, supra note 8 (Fox, dissenting); Romansic, supra note 7, at
315.
991 See, e.g., Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1576-77.
882
 See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1126 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (arguing increased merger activity and resulting increase in conflicts requires
courts to take less mechanical approach" to disqualification).
"9 See id. at 1127.
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tial for deterrence. 304
 Some courts, such as Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining
Eq' Smelting Co., recognize the importance of the fault element in any
loyalty analysis, but cling to a per se rule, 305 They try to incorporate
fault by implementing a balancing test as a second step after a per se
conflict rule.° This approach is correct in incorporating the valuable
factual element of fault, but is theoretically flawed in using a per se
approach when the conflict is against a client's family member be-
cause, as already seen, a per se rule is unduly formalistic and inconsis-
tent with corporate norms. 307
 Furthermore, a Gould approach at-
tempts to take into account fault, but fails to fully recognize its
implications in terms of remedies. 908
 For example, because the Gould
analysis is based on a per se rule, there is a presumptive conflict that
must be addressed by the court. 30
 There are therefore only two re-
sults to the balancing test step in Gould: disqualification or with-
drawal. 31° Such an approach ignores that when a law firm is not at
fault, and the conflict is with a current client's affiliate, that there may
be no conflict at al1. 311
 A better approach recognizes that, like the
other elements of the balancing test, the no-fault element goes di-
rectly to whether there is actually any conflict of interest present. 312
These elements, therefore, may not just weigh in favor of allowing
withdrawal over disqualification, but could also show that in a corpo-
rate family context withdrawal may not be necessary either. 3"
Equally important to including the no-fault element in any con-
sideration of current client conflicts in the corporate family situation,
or even the traditional client conflict situation, is not overvaluing its
importance.'" It is vitally important in any balancing test not to look
blindly at each factor in the test, but to consider each in light of the
underlying concern: preserving the value of loyalty. 315 An example of
overvaluing fault and ignoring the underlying ethical concerns can be
3131 See supra notes 162-278.
305 See Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1126-27.
1°6 See id.
3°7 See supra notes 108-158.
300 See Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127; see also supra notes 325-326.
309 See Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127.
310 See id. (noting that because there was a conflict of interest that representation of
one of the clients must be discontinued).
311 See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 664.
313 see id,
313 See supra notes 237-238.
314 See Uniu of Rochester; 2000 U.S. Dist LEX1S 19030, at *27-30.
318 See
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seen in a literal reading of the Restatement approach.316 In the Restate-
ment a balancing test is applied to determine if there is a conflict. 317
Fault is not, however, a factor in this test. 318 Instead, the fault element
is treated as an exception to the determination of a conflict under the
balancing test. 216 Presumably, then, the law firm's lack of fault over-
rides the determination of whether there is a conflict under the bal-
ancing test. 3" The court in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.
explicitly cites the Restatement approach and rejects an automatic ex-
ception based on the law firm's lack of fault. 321
 Instead, the court
praises the case law approach that uses the fault element as only one
factor in the balancing test. 322 The Restatement approach is inferior to
the case-law approach because it ignores why fault is important: be-
cause it has loyalty implications. 323
 In allowing an automatic exception
based on fault, the Restatement ignores other actions by the law firm
that may shift the balance in favor of withdrawal or disqualification. 324
For instance, a law firm could be innocent of creating the conflict, but
act inappropriately in addressing that conflict. 325
 It could fail to ade-
quately inform the clients of the conflict when it is discovered, delay
in addressing the problem, or otherwise act in a way that compro-
mises loyalty and warrants disqualification. 326
CONCLUSION
Disqualification motions in current client conflicts raise many
competing values, the most basic of which are maintenance of judicial
integrity versus the right of parties to choose their own representa-
tion. When there is a traditional client conflict the courts favor dis-
qualification, finding the risk to loyalty values too extreme. Yet, when
there is a corporate affiliate situation, or when the conflict is created
316 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 132 ant. j.
sls See id, § 121 cmt. d.
318 See id.
sis See id. § 132 cmt. j.
325 See id,
321 Unitt of Rochester; 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19030, at *29-30 (noting that courts have
adopted the no-fault factor as one factor to be considered in balancing facts and circum-
stances, not as a "cure" as in the Restatement).
sn See id.
323 See id.
324 see id.
323
 See id.; Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1127 (noting that the law firm was unethically slow in
responding to the conflict and that this is a serious breach of ethics).
326 See Univ. of Rochester, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *29-30.
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by client business decisions and not the law firm, the balance may and
should be shifted. The courts should follow the flexible, practical,
balancing of facts and circumstances approach instead of a strict per
se rule. Such an approach rejects labels and formalistic rules and
looks to determine if loyalty is really at risk. It protects the integrity of
the profession by disqualifying law firms that have compromised loy-
alty, but refuses to undermine the profession by allowing dis-
qualification to be used as a litigation tactic.
A balancing of the facts and circumstances must consider all facts
that implicate loyalty, including the law firm's fault in creating the
conflict. Whether the actions of the law firm were inappropriate is
directly relevant to loyalty and to the justified expectations of that cli-
ent. Additionally, when a law firm is not at fault disqualification serves
no sanctioning or preventative value. The balance of the facts and cir-
cumstances may therefore lean towards withdrawal or continued rep-
resentation when the law firm's lack of fault is taken into account.
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